





RECOVERING FOR THE LOSS OF A BELOVED PET: 
RETHINKING THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF 
COMPANION ANIMALS AND  
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LOSS OF COMPANIONSHIP 
TORT DAMAGES 
LAUREN M. SIROIS† 
Under U.S. law, animals are considered the property of their human 
companions. With this classification, individuals are granted the right to own, use, 
and control their animal property as they see fit. To many, though, the relationship 
between man and his companion animal fits uncomfortably within the idea of 
property ownership. To these individuals, companion animals, such as dogs and 
cats, are more than property: they are best friends, confidants, and integral parts of 
the family. However, unlike certain familial relationships—such as that of a 
husband and wife or a parent and child—the bond between a human companion 
and his or her companion animal is devalued under tort law. When a companion 
animal is negligently or intentionally injured or killed, no matter how beloved the 
animal is to his or her human companion, the animal is still only viewed as 
property under the law. Because of the companion animal’s classification as 
property, emotional damages related to the bond between the animal and the 
plaintiff are unavailable, preventing those who have been harmed from fully 
recovering for their loss. 
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The bond between a human and a dog or a cat, the two most accepted 
species of “companion animal,”1 is anything but novel. The domestication of 
animals is estimated to have occurred 12,000 to 14,000 years ago. 2 
Specifically, the domestication of dogs is thought to have occurred during 
this time period,3 while it is estimated that cats became household animals 
roughly 4500 years ago.4 Today, over 68 million domesticated dogs are 
living in U.S. homes,5 with 39% of the U.S. population owning at least one 
dog.6 Many companion animals are “named, nurtured, and treated like 
 
1 For the purpose of this Comment, unless otherwise noted, “companion animal” refers to a 
domesticated dog or cat that was bred for human companionship. Companion animals are 
commonly considered a subcategory of domesticated animals. See Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s 
and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 
69 (2002) [hereinafter Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend]. In Valuing a Man’s and 
Woman’s Best Friend, Rebecca J. Huss writes that whether an animal is considered a companion 
animal is determined by evaluating evidence of the relationship between the animal and the 
human companion. Id. The word “pet,” defined as an animal that is “tamed or domesticated and 
kept as a companion or treated with fondness,” encompasses other common household animals, 
including rabbits, hamsters, mice and other rodents, fish, birds, lizards, and snakes. Janice M. 
Pintar, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and the Fair Market Value Approach in 
Wisconsin: The Case for Extending Tort Protection to Companion Animals and Their Owners, 2002 WIS. 
L. REV. 735, 738 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 2009 (3d ed. 1991)). This 
Comment avoids the term “pet.” While the abovementioned animals are arguably no different 
from a dog or a cat in the sense that they can fit the requirements of a “companion animal,” the 
arguments for altering the property classification of animals or expanding loss of companionship 
recovery are stronger when focused solely on dogs and cats. 
2 See Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82 NEB. 
L. REV. 783, 805 (2004) (“Domestication of non-human animals . . . began 12,000 years ago . . . .”); 
Marcella S. Roukas, Determining the Value of Companion Animals in Wrongful Harm or Death Claims: 
A Survey of U.S. Decisions and Legislative Proposal in Florida to Authorize Recovery for Loss of 
Companionship, 3 J. ANIMAL L. 45, 51 (2007) (“The domestication of animals began almost 14,000 
years ago.”).  
3 Schyler P. Simmons, Comment, What is the Next Step for Companion Pets in the Legal System? 
The Answer May Lie with the Historical Development of the Legal Rights for Minors, 1 TEX. A&M L. 
REV. 253, 254 (2013); see also Phil Goldberg, Courts and Legislatures Have Kept the Proper Leash on 
Pet Injury Lawsuits: Why Rejecting Emotion-Based Damages Promotes the Rule of Law, Modern Values, 
and Animal Welfare, 6 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 30, 65 (2013) (“The domestication of dogs 
occurred more than 14,000 years ago.”).  
4 Simmons, supra note 3, at 254.  
5 Cynthia A. McNeely & Sarah A. Lindquist, Dangerous Dog Laws: Failing to Give Man’s Best 
Friend a Fair Shake at Justice, 3 J. ANIMAL L. 99, 103 (2007). 
6 Simmons, supra note 3, at 254; see also id. (“[M]ore than 33% of the [U.S.] population own 
cats.”).  
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children, siblings, or best friends”7 and provide their human companions 
with “faithful, intimate companionship that is unconditional and 
nonjudgmental.”8 Companion animals are more than just pets; to many, 
they are part of the family.9 Margit Livingston, Professor of Law at DePaul 
University College of Law, argues that human companions build 
“sentimental attachment” to their companion animals, an emotional 
connection based upon the appreciation of their companionship—“their 
loyalty, their physical proximity, [and] their dependence upon us”—which is 
similar to the attachment one would have toward another human being.10  
The death of a companion animal can be emotionally and psychologically 
devastating for a human companion. 11 In fact, human companions can 
experience a sense of loss similar to the loss felt when a human family 
member passes away.12 Even so, when a companion animal dies due to the 
negligent or intentional acts of another, the U.S. tort system inadequately 
compensates the human companion. U.S. law almost universally denies 
recovery for loss of companionship damages in tort actions when the injured 
or deceased victim is a companion animal.13 Why? First, companion animals 
are classified as the property of their human companions, even though 
 
7 Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in 
Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1059 (1995). 
8 Id. at 1065.  
9 See Christopher D. Seps, Note, Animal Law Evolution: Treating Pets as Persons in Tort and 
Custody Disputes, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1359 (referencing studies finding that 88% of 
Australian pet owners and 49% of American pet owners described their dog as a “family member”) 
(citing Emma Power, Furry Families: Making a Human-Dog Family Through Home, 9 SOC. & 
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 535, 536 (2008)).  
10 Livingston, supra note 2, at 819. 
11 See Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1069-70 (“The deep emotional attachment people feel for 
their companion animals embodies itself in a grief which can be the same in form and intensity as 
the grief . . . felt when a . . . friend or relative dies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
12 See Sabrina DeFabritiis, Barking up the Wrong Tree: Companion Animals, Emotional Damages 
and the Judiciary’s Failure to Keep Pace, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 237, 243-44 (2012) (“The human 
companion experiences a deep sense of loss upon the untimely death of the companion animal 
similar to that which is experienced following the death of a family member.”).  
13  “Loss of companionship” is an element of tort damages awarded to a plaintiff to 
compensate him or her for the loss suffered after the defendant harms his or her loved one. See 
Andrew Boxberger, The Missing Link in the Evolution of Law: Michigan’s Failure to Reflect Society’s 
Value of Companion Animals, 5 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 139, 148 (2002) (noting loss 
of companionship damages were created in an attempt to fill the tremendous void created when a 
loved one dies); Kelly Wilson, Note, Catching the Unique Rabbit: Why Pets Should be Reclassified as 
Inimitable Property Under the Law, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 167, 178 (2009) (“Loss of companionship 
can be one element in determining the value of a wrongful death of a family member to a living 
family member who experiences the loss.”); see also infra Part II.  
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human companions do not think of their companion animals as property,14 
leaving plaintiffs with limited recourse to recover for their loss.15 Restricted 
by the property classification, plaintiffs can only recover the “fair market 
value” of their companion animals,16 and loss of companionship claims are 
almost always unanimously dismissed.17  
Second, under the history of loss of companionship and its predecessor, 
loss of consortium, recovery is limited to specific relationships. Most states 
have limited loss of companionship recovery to husbands and wives, with a 
few providing recovery for parents and children.18 This treatment contradicts 
how many humans view their companion animals and the bonds between 
them. Consequently, it fails to fully compensate those who have been 
injured.19  
Fortunately, a minority position is slowly gaining steam. In recent years, 
a small number of state legislatures and courts have allowed individuals to 
receive compensation for the loss of companionship of their injured or 
deceased companion animal. For example, Tennessee’s “T-Bo Act” allows 
for recovery of up to $5000 in noneconomic damages for the negligent or 
intentional killing of a domesticated dog or cat under certain conditions,20 
 
14 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 281 (“[S]eventy-three percent of dog owners and sixty-five 
percent of cat owners consider their companion animals to be like a child or family member.” 
(citing Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues Relating to Companion 
Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 181 (2003))). 
15 See Jason R. Scott, Note, Death to Poochy: A Comparison of Historical and Modern Frustrations 
Faced by Owners of Injured or Killed Pet Dogs, 75 UMKC L. REV. 569, 569 (2006) (“[O]wners are 
limited in their courses of action and recovery should their property/pet/best friend be injured or 
even killed.”). 
16 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 263 (“[D]amages for the death of a companion pet are fixed 
at . . . market value in most jurisdictions.”). 
17 See Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird, Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation: The 
Serious Need to Preserve a Rational Rule, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 227, 241-42 (2006) (discussing how the 
vast majority of courts “do not permit . . . the pet’s sentimental value or the owner’s loss of 
companionship” to influence damages); see also Kaufman v. Langhofer, 222 P.3d 272, 279 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2009) (“Expanding Arizona common law to allow a pet owner to recover emotional distress 
or loss of companionship damages would be inappropriate . . . .”); Lachenman v. Stice, 838 
N.E.2d 451, 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he bottom line is that a dog is personal property, and 
the measure of damages for the destruction of personal property is the fair market value thereof at 
the time of the destruction.”).  
18 See infra Part II; see also Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1082 (“[S]everal courts have expanded 
the traditional consortium claim to other close personal or familial relationships.”).  
19 See Diane Sullivan & Holly Vietzke, An Animal is Not an iPod, 4 J. ANIMAL L. 41, 41-42 
(2008) (“Our legal system just does not recognize the bond between people and their companion 
animals, and when that bond is severed, it completely fails to compensate for that loss.”).  
20 TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (West 2014). 
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while an Illinois statute allows plaintiffs to recover emotional and punitive 
damages for certain acts toward their animals.21  
Additionally, some courts have also departed from the common law’s 
market value recovery limit for the loss of a companion animal. In Brousseau 
v. Rosenthal, the New York County Civil Court acknowledged that “actual value 
to the owner” must be assessed, and in doing so, the court must consider loss of 
companionship.22  Courts have also expressed their discontent with the 
property classification of companion animals: in Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat 
Hospital, Inc., a New York trial court recognized that “[a] pet is not an 
inanimate thing that just receives affection[,] it also returns it.”23  
While still a minority position,24 what do these legislative and judicial 
actions mean for the legal classification of companion animals as property 
and the scope of loss of companionship damages claims? Can we justify the 
minority position within our current legal framework or must we rethink 
the law? This Comment will explore the recent minority developments, 
argue that they reflect a growing movement towards recognizing that 
companion animals are more than just property and that human companions 
deserve just compensation from our legal system, and consider two 
proposals outlining how the law could better address the loss of a 
companion animal. 
Part I will review the classification of companion animals as property 
under U.S. law. After introducing the general concept of legal property, it will 
address the history and reasoning behind the property classification. Part I 
will then describe what this categorization means legally for human 
companions, including what happens during a tort suit for the injury to or 
killing of a companion animal and how human companions are compensated. 
Part II will explore the development of and the intention behind loss of 
companionship damages claims in tort. This Part will include an overview of 
the recovery’s origin, as well as the majority view of how it extends (or does 
not extend) to companion animals.  
 
21 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16.3 (West 2014). 
22 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980) (“[I]t would be wrong not to acknowledge the 
companionship and protection that Ms. Brousseau lost with the death of her canine companion of 
eight years.”); see infra subsection III.B.1.a. 
23 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979).  
24 For purposes of this Comment, “minority position” refers to the beliefs and rationales of 
those who advocate for allowing human companions to recover loss of companionship damages for 
the negligent or intentional injury to or killing of a companion animal. Supporters of the minority 
position believe human companions should be able to recover loss of companionship damages and 
advocate for one or both of the proposed solutions this Comment addresses: defining companion 
animals as “semi-property” and expanding loss of companionship damages for human companions. 
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With the important background information covered in Parts I and II, 
Part III will discuss the recent evolution of loss of companionship damages 
claims for companion animals across the United States. First, Part III will 
focus on specific laws enacted by state legislatures in Tennessee, Illinois, and 
Connecticut. Second, Part III will discuss common law court decisions 
covering both the acceptance and rejection of loss of companionship 
damages as well as the acceptance of recovery for other emotional damages.  
Part IV will introduce popular arguments for the expansion of loss of 
companionship damages to compensate human companions. In support of 
the minority position are the arguments that awarding loss of 
companionship damages promotes the goals of tort law, is a natural next 
step, and is rational because companion animals currently receive different 
protections and treatment under various laws.  
Finally, Part V will discuss two proposed solutions that will allow human 
companions to recover loss of companionship damages. First, this Part will 
consider a new special “semi-property” classification for companion animals, 
including oppositional arguments and responses in rebuttal. Second, it will 
explore a statutory scheme promoting the expansion of loss of 
companionship, including oppositional arguments and responses in rebuttal.  
I. COMPANION ANIMALS AS PROPERTY UNDER U.S. LAW 
Animals are defined as property because it is convenient—and profitable. This 
[definition] allows them to be exploited, harmed and used for experimentation and 
entertainment, all with impunity.25  
Whether or not you agree with this statement, animals, including 
companion animals, are indisputably categorized as property under the 
law.26 
A. The History of Property and the Classification of Animals 
Property law in the United States is tied to the common law.27 Under 
the common law, individuals have a “natural” right to their property, a right 
 
25 Sullivan & Vietzke, supra note 19, at 44. 
26 See Roukas, supra note 2, at 47 (“According to [U.S.] common law, animals are considered 
personal property.”).  
27 See id. (“The U.S. legal framework on the law of property is a creature of the common 
law.”); see also Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
531, 533 (1998) (“In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the law of property has developed largely as 
common law.”). 
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of absolute possession limited only by a few restrictions.28 Property, as 
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is “[a]ny external thing over which the 
rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised.” 29  Specifically, 
personal property is defined as “[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is 
subject to ownership” and does not include real property (e.g., land).30  
Under U.S. common law, non-wild, domesticated animals—including 
the subcategory of companion animals—are considered to be their human 
owner’s personal property.31 The concept of classifying animals as property 
has roots deep within human history; many ancient cultures treated animals 
as property or “things.”32 While the common law did not always consider 
companion animals as property,33 this view developed as dogs, specifically, 
began to be seen as valuable and useful to their owners. The legal status of 
property was soon thereafter attached;34 and every state currently classifies 
companion animals as such.35 This classification was typically codified by a 
statute or defined by the courts through the pronouncement that such 
animals were “chattel.” 36  Therefore, the legal relationship between a 
 
28 Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 1, at 68. 
29 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “property”). 
30 Id. at 1411 (defining “personal property”). 
31 See generally Roukas, supra note 2, at 47. Under U.S. law, animals are categorized as either 
“wild” or “domestic,” and companion animals are considered a specific subdivision of domesticated 
animals. Id. at 48-49; see also supra note 1.  
32 See McNeely & Lindquist, supra note 5, at 109 (“Non-feral, domesticated dogs were 
treated as human personal property by particular ancient cultures.”); see also Steven M. Wise, 
Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of Companionship for 
the Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33, 60 (1998) (“Since Roman times, law 
has partitioned the material world into things and persons . . . . At one time, women, children, 
human slaves, and nonhuman animals were all ‘things’ under Roman law.”). The Holy Bible also 
addresses man’s dominion over animals: “Then God said, Let Us make man in Our image, 
according to Our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of 
the air, and over the cattle, over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps on the 
earth.” Genesis 1:26 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33 See Harold W. Hannah, Animals as Property—Changing Concepts, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 571, 575 
(2001) (“[D]ogs were not regarded as property at common law . . . because dogs served no 
purpose but instead were kept merely for the ‘whims and pleasures’ of their owners.”); see also Lisa 
Kirk, Comment, Recognizing Man’s Best Friend: An Evaluation of Damages Awarded When a 
Companion Pet is Wrongfully Killed, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 115, 118 (2003) (“The courts reasoned 
that dogs were not property because they served no specific purpose, being kept solely for the 
‘pleasure of their owners.’”). 
34 See McNeely & Lindquist, supra note 5, at 110 (“Eventually, dogs came to be legally 
recognized as the personal property of humans . . . .”).  
35 Seps, supra note 9, at 1342. 
36 See Elizabeth Paek, Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family: Dismantling the Property 
Classification of Companion Animals by Statute, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 481, 490-91 (2003) (describing 
chattel as “a term intended to cover every kind of personal property”). 
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companion animal and a human companion is commonly one of property 
ownership.37 
B. How the Property Classification Impacts Human Companions 
The holder of a property interest is entitled to certain legal rights. The 
right to use and enjoy one’s property is minimally restricted, including a 
limitation on the use of one’s property to harm another. 38  Generally, 
property can be “bought, sold, traded, gifted, devised, and bequeathed.”39 
Like other forms of property, companion animals can be bought or sold, and 
human companions are granted “nearly unlimited authority” to make 
decisions regarding their companion animals.40 Here, the law differentiates 
animals from other forms of property, affording the former specific 
protections. The Animal Welfare Act41 regulates the treatment of animals 
used in interstate or foreign commerce, including animals involved in 
research and exhibition, and every state has enacted animal anticruelty 
statutes.42 
The classification of companion animals as property impacts the ability 
of a human companion to recover damages in a tort action for the negligent 
or intentional injury to or killing of a companion animal. The U.S. tort 
system allows for recovery against another person who intentionally or 
negligently injures or destroys one’s personal property.43 Property owners 
are generally refused noneconomic damages in tort cases44 but can seek 
restitution, compensation for the injury or loss, against defendants to 
 
37 Id. at 491. 
38 See Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 1, at 68 (“[A] person can not 
use his or her property to harm an innocent person . . . .”).  
39 Seps, supra note 9, at 1342. 
40 Logan Martin, Comment, Dog Damages: The Case for Expanding the Available Remedies for 
the Owners of Wrongfully Killed Pets in Colorado, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 939 (2011); see also id. 
(“Pet ownership has many things in common with property ownership.”). 
41 Animal Welfare Act of 1966, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012) (describing the Act’s purpose, 
in part, as “insur[ing] that animals . . . are provided humane care and treatment”). 
42 See Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-Cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5 ANIMAL L. 
69, 69 (1999) (“[T]hese laws do not afford animals legal rights [but they] provide . . . legal 
protection . . . to animals in our society.”). For a paradigmatic example of a state anticruelty 
statute, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-202 (2014) (“A person commits cruelty to animals if he or 
she knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence overdrives, overloads, overworks, torments, 
deprives of necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beats [an animal], [or] allows [an animal] 
to be housed in a manner that results in chronic or repeated serious physical harm  . . . .”).  
43 See Adam P. Karp, Causes of Action in Intentional Tort for Loss of or Injury to an Animal by a 
Human, 44 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 211, at § 30 (2010). 
44 See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 44 (“[N]oneconomic damages are generally not permitted 
for harm to property.”). 
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restore them to the position they were in before the defendants’ intentional 
or negligent act.45  
In awarding monetary damages, courts look to compensate plaintiffs for 
“the loss sustained.”46 The most common way courts determine the plaintiff ’s 
loss is to price the property, including companion animals, by its fair market 
value.47 Normally defined, fair market value is “the amount a willing buyer 
will pay for an item and the amount a willing seller will accept for the item 
where neither party is under compulsion to engage in the transaction.”48 If 
the companion animal is injured but not killed, the fair market value 
standard would compensate the plaintiff for the difference between the 
market value of the animal before and after the injury.49 Courts analyze an 
animal’s market value by looking at factors such as the species, breed, and 
pedigree.50 Fair market value is intended to represent the value of what the 
plaintiff lost and the amount he or she would need to spend to purchase a 
replacement.51 Unfortunately, unless a companion animal is a purebred 
breeding animal,52 the animal most likely has little or no market value.53 In 
such situations, some courts instead use the “actual value” or “intrinsic 
value” test to measure damages, factoring in previous expenditures and 
future economic losses to deduce the “actual value” of the animal to the 
 
45 See Carole Lynn Nowicki, Note, The Animal Welfare Act: All Bark and No Bite, 23 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 443, 447 (1999) (“[A] property owner [can] seek restitution against anyone who 
damages his inanimate objects . . . .”); see also Livingston, supra note 2, at 817 (asserting that the 
traditional justification for using fair market value as the standard of compensation for destroyed 
personal property is to make the plaintiff whole).  
46 Karp, supra note 43, § 30. 
47 See Roukas, supra note 2, at 46 (“[T]he valuation of damages for the loss of a companion 
animal is measured as personal property and often times the fair market value.”); see also 
Livingston, supra note 2, at 787 (“[T]ort law applie[s] personal property concepts to the valuation 
of animals.”). Fair market value is often calculated by the value of the animal at the time of death 
or injury. Roukas, supra note 2, at 49. 
48  Livingston, supra note 2, at 784; see also Rebecca J. Huss, Valuation in Veterinary 
Malpractice, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 479, 514 (2003) [hereinafter Huss, Valuation] (citing the same 
definition of fair market value).  
49 Karp, supra note 43, § 30. 
50 Seps, supra note 9, at 1343. A court can establish fair market value by looking at the 
companion animal’s purchase price, specialized skills or training, or future earnings the plaintiff 
could have made off of the animal (e.g., breeding). Huss, Valuation, supra note 48, at 514-15. 
51 Livingston, supra note 2, at 817.  
52 See id. at 789 (“[S]ome pets . . . do have a significant fair market value, especially 
purebred animals used for breeding purposes.”). 
53 See id. (“[M]ost average cats and dogs have a negligible fair market value.”); see also Pintar, 
supra note 1, at 756 (stating that the majority of companion cats and dogs have no market value, 
especially once a dog is no longer a puppy).  
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human companion.54 Regardless of which method is used, most courts 
exclude sentimental value in their calculations. This Comment concentrates 
on the instances in which a court or legislature weighs sentimental value and 
allows recovery for loss of companionship. 
II. THE RECOVERY OF LOSS OF COMPANIONSHIP DAMAGES  
UNDER U.S. TORT LAW 
Under U.S. tort law, loss of companionship has two meanings. First, loss 
of companionship can be raised as a specific cause of action against a 
defendant. 55  Second, loss of companionship may be recoverable as an 
element of damages calculated to award a plaintiff for his or her loss.56 This 
Comment focuses on the latter of these two applications, and henceforth, 
loss of companionship will refer to this category of emotional damages 
under tort law. 
Emotional damages are awarded for pain and suffering,57 while loss of 
companionship damages are awarded specifically to help “fill the void” 
created by the loss of a loved one.58 The reasons for recognizing this 
recovery are similar to the reasons supporting recovery for loss of 
consortium, the sister and predecessor to loss of companionship, and 
include the “loss of support or services, love, companionship, affection, 
[and] society” of another.59 While loss of companionship was not always 
accepted at common law,60 it is now generally used as a measure of damages 
under statutory wrongful death claims and common law loss of consortium 
claims.61  
 
54 See Schwartz & Laird, supra note 17, at 241. The “actual value” test will be described in 
greater detail in subsection III.B.1.  
55 See Wise, supra note 32, at 60-61 (“Separate from claims for emotional distress is the 
independent common law tort of loss of companionship.”). 
56 See Wilson, supra note 13, at 178 (“Loss of companionship can be one element in 
determining the value of a wrongful death of a family member to a living family member who 
experiences the loss.”). 
57 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 263 (“The court broadly defines emotional damages as pain 
and suffering.”). 
58 Boxberger, supra note 13, at 148. 
59 Simmons, supra note 3, at 263. 
60 Roukas, supra note 2, at 51. 
61 See Wilson, supra note 13, at 178-79 (“[L]oss of companionship is . . . generally used as a 
measure in wrongful death and loss of consortium claims.”); see also Anzalone v. Kragness, 326 
N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ill. 2005) (“[The] loss of companionship of a spouse is recognized both pursuant 
to the Wrongful Death Act and at common law for loss of consortium resulting from nonfatal 
injuries to the spouse.”); Vasiliki Agorianitis, Comment, Being Daphne’s Mom: An Argument for 
Valuing Companion Animals as Companions, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1453, 1470 (2006) (“Loss of 
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The history of loss of companionship damages begins with the recovery 
of loss of consortium. Arising out of the marriage relationship,62 loss of 
consortium was recognized early on as “the legal right of a husband to his 
wife’s company.”63 Recovery was limited to husbands who had lost the 
“companionship and services of their wives due to the negligent or 
intentional acts” of a third person.64 Over time, the recovery expanded to 
embrace the emotional loss of either spouse and to include the loss of affection 
and companionship.65 Companionship came to be viewed as an “element of 
consortium,” giving both spouses the right to enjoy the company and 
affection of their partner.66  
More recently, some states and courts have recognized that loss of 
companionship recovery should extend to other important relationships, 
such as that of a parent and child.67 At first, recovery was available only to a 
parent and only for economic damages (including a child’s services or 
earning capacity).68 This approach to recovery was seen as inadequate69 
 
companionship is an element of damages traditionally included in the concept of 
consortium . . . .”). 
62 See Agorianitis, supra note 61, at 1459 (“Loss of companionship is based on the concept of 
consortium, which arises out of the marriage relationship.”); see also Wise, supra note 32, at 61 
(“Loss of companionship is intimately related to traditional claims for loss of consortium derived 
from the marriage relationship . . . .”). 
63 Kirk, supra note 33, at 130; see also Wise, supra note 32, at 60 (“Loss of consortium existed 
because a wife was considered her husband’s servant, and both servants and wife were his 
chattels.”). 
64 Wilson, supra note 13, at 179; see also Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra 
note 1, at 91 (“Loss of consortium claims were originally limited to the material services that a wife 
provided in the home.”). 
65 See Huss, Valuation, supra note 48, at 526 (“A more sentimental concept later developed 
that considered a spouse’s loss of affection and companionship.”); Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 
1082 (“Although historically based upon conjugal rights, a loss of consortium claim now includes 
the loss of companionship and affection as well.”); Wilson, supra note 13, at 179 (“The right to 
recover on a loss of consortium claim has only been extended to wives within the last sixty 
years.”). 
66 Kirk, supra note 33, at 122; see also Martin, supra note 40, at 943 (“[A] tortfeasor who causes 
the death of the plaintiff’s spouse can be required to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the 
spouse’s ‘affection, society, companionship, and aid and comfort.’”).  
67 See Agorianitis, supra note 61, at 1459-60 (“[S]ome courts have . . . include[d] recovery 
based on such other relationships as parent and child.”); see also Villareal v. Dept. of Transp., 774 
P.2d 213, 216 (Ariz. 1989) (“Today, we . . . recognize a child’s right to recover for the loss of 
parental consortium.”); Norvell v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Hosp., 463 N.E.2d 111, 114 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1983) (“The legislatively announced public policy now permits recovery by the parent for loss of 
[a] deceased child’s society.”). 
68 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 264 (“[C]ourts limited damages to economic losses—those 
losses that could be measured by a monetary standard.”). 
69 Limiting recovery solely to economic damages was seen as inadequate because “the worth 
of a child decedent’s life equates primarily with the value of that child’s affection and companionship” 
instead of the services the child renders to his or her parents. Livingston, supra note 2, at 802. 
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during the last half-century,70 leading some courts and legislatures to decide 
that parents could recover for the loss of a deceased or injured child’s 
companionship. 71  Children may also recover for the loss of parental 
consortium.72 Today, scholars argue that loss of companionship should be 
extended to include the negligent or intentional killing of or injury to a 
companion animal.73 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF LOSS OF COMPANIONSHIP  
DAMAGES FOR COMPANION ANIMALS 
Most jurisdictions deny human companions loss of companionship 
damages for the negligent or intentional killing of or injury to a companion 
animal. However, legislatures and courts have varied in how they address 
emotional damages for human companions.74 This Part delves deeper into 
recent developments and discusses specific legislative actions and judicial 
decisions that are pushing, and in some instances breaking, the barriers of 
the old common law denial of recovery. 
 
70 For example, in Michigan, the Supreme Court first awarded loss of companionship 
damages for the death of a child in 1960. Boxberger, supra note 13, at 143-45. The right to receive 
such damages was later codified by the legislature in 1971. Id. In Illinois, the state Supreme Court 
allowed such damages first in 1984 in Bullard v. Barnes. 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ill. 1984). In its 
decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois noted that fourteen states then allowed recovery by a 
parent. Id. at 1232. 
71 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 264 (“It was not until 1988 . . . that a growing number of 
states began recognizing that parents could have a claim of . . . loss of consortium for a child’s 
injury or death.”); see also Kirk, supra note 33, at 130-31 (“[C]ourts in a growing number of states 
have held that a parent’s claim for loss of a child’s comfort, society and companionship may be 
maintained where a minor child has been injured.”). 
72 See Huss, Valuation, supra note 48, at 526 (“[S]everal states have recognized a child’s claim 
for the loss of parental consortium.”); Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 1, at 
92 (recognizing the same extension of recovery). The Supreme Court of Kentucky decided in 1997 
that children should be allowed to recover damages for the loss of a parent. Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 
S.W.2d 318, 319 (Ky. 1997). The court stated: “It is a natural development of the common law to 
recognize the need for a remedy for those children who lose the love and affection of their parents 
due to the negligence of another. It is necessary for this Court to conform the common law so as 
to provide a remedy for loss of consortium for children . . . .” Id. 
73 See, e.g., Agorianitis, supra note 61, at 1470-71 (advocating for the expansion of loss of 
companionship recovery to cover companion animals).  
74 Compare Wise, supra note 32, at 69 (“Historically, owners of companion animals were 
denied common law damages for emotional distress and loss of society for the wrongful deaths of 
their companion animals . . . .”), with Kirk, supra note 33, at 120 (“Courts have been inconsistent 
in their recognition of the sentimental value of a pet to an owner who has lost his or her 
companion.”), and McNeely & Lindquist, supra note 5, at 110 (“Currently, there is an undeniable 
philosophical shift emerging within the judicial system which is struggling with whether or not it 
should continue to treat dogs as the personal property of humans, and if not, just exactly how 
should they be legally treated.”). 
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A. Legislative Developments 
If a change in the law is to occur, it is up to the Legislature, not the Courts, to 
decide that a dog named Fido, a cat named Boots, a hamster named Harry, or a 
fish called Wanda can have some new species of personal injury action brought on 
their behalf.75  
Courts and advocates alike have noted that state legislatures are best 
suited to address the expansion of tort recovery. Denying recovery for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress for the plaintiff ’s deceased dog in 
Rabideau v. City of Racine, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted that the 
legislature was the proper forum to “make a considered policy judgment 
regarding the societal value of pets as companions and to specify the nature 
of the damages to be awarded in a lawsuit.”76 A few state legislatures have 
made such policy judgments, enacting statutes expanding a human 
companion’s ability to recover emotional damages. 
1. Tennessee 
In 2000, Tennessee became the first state to pass a law allowing for the 
recovery of noneconomic, emotional damages, including the loss of 
companionship, for the intentional or negligent killing of a companion 
animal.77 Known as the “T-Bo Act,” the original bill was introduced after 
State Senator Steve Cohen’s shih tzu, T-Bo, was killed by another dog.78 
After learning that his recovery was limited to the market value of T-Bo and 
his veterinary expenses, Cohen introduced the bill that would later become 
law.79  
Recovery is allowed when a pet80  dog or cat is killed due to the 
“unlawful and intentional, or negligent, act of another.”81 If the act was 
 
75 Naples v. Miller, No. 08C-01-093, 2009 WL 1163504, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2009). 
76 627 N.W.2d 795, 807 (Wis. 2001). 
77 W.C. Root, Note, “Man’s Best Friend”: Property or Family Member? An Examination of the 
Legal Classification of Companion Animals and its Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their Wrongful 
Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 435 (2002); see also DeFabritiis, supra note 12, at 256 
(“Tennessee was the first state to adopt a statute expressly authorizing the recovery of non-
economic damages for the death of a companion animal.”). 
78 Honoring Animal Victims: Landmarks in Legislation, ANIMAL L. DEF. FUND (Feb. 10, 2009), 
http://www.aldf.org/downloads/ALDF_Honoring_Animal_Victims_Landmarks.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H24N-C86L. 
79 Id.; see also Scott, supra note 15, at 588 (telling the story behind the enactment of the T-
Bo Act). 
80  Under Tennessee law, “pet” is defined as “any domesticated dog or cat normally 
maintained in or near the household of its owner.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(b) (2014).  
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negligent, the incident must have occurred on the plaintiff ’s property or 
while under his or her “control or supervision.”82 Recovery of noneconomic 
damages, including “compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected 
society, companionship, love and affection of the pet,” is capped at $5000.83 
While revolutionary in many respects, the statute contains strict applicatory 
restrictions. Besides applying only to killed or fatally injured dogs and cats 
and capping recoverable damages, the T-Bo Act exempts not-for-profit 
organizations and governmental agencies, including their employees, acting 
for the public health or animal welfare, and negligent killings by licensed 
veterinarians.84 Nevertheless, the T-Bo Act is viewed as the first statute of 
its kind advancing the rights of human companions to recover for the loss of 
their pets’ companionship.85 
2. Illinois  
Illinois is the only other state besides Tennessee that currently allows 
the recovery of noneconomic, emotional damages after the loss of a 
companion animal.86 Illinois’s Humane Care for Animals Act,87 codified two 
years after the enactment of Tennessee’s T-Bo Act,88 covers all animals89 
that are subject to acts of cruelty, torture, or impounded in bad faith.90 An 
individual may recover, “but [is] not limited to, the monetary value of the 
animal, veterinary expenses [, and] . . . any other expenses [to] rectify[] 
the effects of the cruelty, pain, and suffering of the animal, and emotional 
 
81 Id. § 44-17-403(a)(1) (“If a person’s pet is killed or sustains injuries that result in death 
caused by the unlawful and intentional, or negligent, act of another or the animal of another, the 
trier of fact may find the individual causing the death or the owner of the animal causing the death 
liable . . . .”).  
82 Id.; see also Goldberg, supra note 3, at 60-61 (“Tennessee’s statute applies only to pets 
negligently injured or killed on the property of their owners, such as in their backyards, or under 
the owner’s control, such as on a leash.”). 
83  TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(1), (d). Section (c) clarifies that the cap on damages 
does not cover claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. § 44-17-403(c). 
84 Id. § 44-17-403(e).  
85 See Root, supra note 77, at 435 (“The T-Bo Act is a positive development for companion 
animal owners because it expands available damages.”).  
86 Goldberg, supra note 3, at 60.  
87 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16.3 (West 2014). 
88 DeFabritiis, supra note 12, at 257. 
89 The statute does not limit its application to “pets,” “companion animals,” or “dogs and 
cats.” Id. (“[I]n Illinois a human companion may recover for any animal to which a person has a 
right of ownership—recovery is not limited to dogs and cats.”). 
90 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16.3. 
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distress suffered by the owner.”91 Plaintiffs are also entitled to punitive damages 
ranging from $500 to $25,000 for each covered act.92  
The Illinois law is more expansive than the Tennessee statute in some 
respects while more restrictive in others. On one hand, the Illinois law 
allows recovery for human companions of animals other than dogs and cats, 
provides recovery even if the companion animal is non-fatally injured,93 and 
includes recovery not only for emotional distress but also for veterinary and 
other financial expenses.94 On the other hand, the Illinois law is more 
restrictive in that it specifies only certain acts of an aggressor for which 
recovery is available95 and does not allow recovery for injuries resulting 
from a third party’s negligence.96  
3. Connecticut 
Because they permit recovery for emotional damages in some pet 
lawsuits, the Tennessee and Illinois statutes are unique among state laws. 
However, other states have taken small steps along the road to expanding 
recovery for human companions mourning the loss of their companion 
animals. One of those states is Connecticut. 
Connecticut law dictates that one who “intentionally kills or injures a 
companion animal,” defined as a dog or cat,97 is liable for economic damages 
including veterinary care, fair value of the animal, and burial expenses.98 A 
court may also award punitive damages and attorneys’ fees following 
statutory limits; however, these may not be imposed upon a licensed 
veterinarian, a state employee or officer, or an animal cruelty or animal 
protection volunteer if the defendant was acting within the scope of his or 
 
91 Id. (emphasis added). 
92 Id. 
93 Id.; see also Rebecca J. Huss, Recent Developments in Animal Law, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 233, 248 (2005) [hereinafter Huss, Recent Developments] (describing the scope of the 
Illinois law). 
94 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16.3; see also Scott, supra note 15, at 588 (discussing the 
contents of the Illinois law). 
95 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16.3; see also Huss, Recent Developments, supra note 93, at 
248 (“[T]he animal must have been subject to an act of aggravated cruelty or torture or have been 
impounded in bad faith.”). 
96 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16.3; see Goldberg, supra note 3, at 60 (“In Illinois, the law 
applies only to acts of aggravated cruelty, torture, or bad faith, not negligence.”). 
97 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-351a(a) (West 2014) (“‘[C]ompanion animal’ means a 
domesticated dog or cat that is normally kept in or near the household of its owner or keeper and 
is dependent on a person for food, shelter and veterinary care . . . .”). 
98 Id. § 22-351a(b). 
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her employment. 99  Unlike the Tennessee and Illinois statutes, the 
Connecticut statute does not allow for the recovery of noneconomic, 
emotional damages.100 However, the Connecticut statute still represents a 
step in the right direction. 
Though statutes like those in Tennessee, Illinois, and even Connecticut 
are few and far between, there has been an increase in proposed state 
legislation pushing for emotional damages for the injury to or killing of a 
companion animal.101 The statutes discussed here may inspire more states to 
expand human companions’ ability to recover emotional damages. 
B. Common Law Developments 
The vast majority of courts have ruled that damages should be limited to 
the fair market value of the companion animal and have denied the recovery 
of emotional damages, including compensation for loss of companionship.102 
A few courts have broken from this tradition and allowed damages to reflect 
the sentimental value of the companion animal, with some courts 
specifically including damages for loss of companionship. This Section will 
review important cases that have pushed the boundaries of recovery as well 
as cases where courts have maintained the status quo.  
1. The Acceptance of Loss of Companionship Damages as Part of the 
“Actual Value” of a Companion Animal 
When a court rejects the fair market value test, it often turns to an 
“actual value” or “intrinsic value” measurement of damages.103 The court 
may then factor in the animal’s original purchase price, money spent during 
 
99  See id. § 22-351a(c)-(d) (stating that to escape possible punitive damages, licensed 
veterinarians must have followed “accepted standards of practice”). 
100 See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 61 (defining the allowable damages). 
101 See Agorianitis, supra note 61, at 1461 (describing legislative proposals that would allow for 
damages in the wrongful death or injury of companion animals). For a review of proposed 
legislation in other states, see Elaine T. Byszewski, Comment, Valuing Companion Animals in 
Wrongful Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing 
Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215, 226-30 (2003) (discussing proposed legislation, 
at the time of publication, in states such as California, Colorado, New York, and Rhode Island, as 
well as failed bills in Maryland, Oregon, and Connecticut). 
102 See supra Section I.B. 
103 See Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 1, at 89 (“A state may allow 
for the elevation of damages based on the ‘actual or intrinsic value of the animal.’”); see also Kirk, 
supra note 33, at 119 (“In some jurisdictions, where the dog is found not to have market value, 
courts look to its actual, intrinsic value to the owner.”); Schwartz & Laird, supra note 17, at 240-41 
(stating that some courts may allow recovery of the value to the owner if market value cannot be 
calculated).  
  
1216 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1199 
 
the animal’s life (e.g., veterinary bills), training costs, and loss of future 
income from the animal (e.g., special services or breeding) into the damages 
calculation.104 The actual value standard recognizes that companion animals 
have value beyond the open market.105 A vast majority of courts using “actual 
value” will exclude sentimental value—including the loss of companionship—
from their damages calculations. 106  Other courts, however, include 
sentimental value, “the feelings or emotions in connection with ‘normal’ 
feelings of loss,”107 with some courts going as far as to explicitly factor in 
loss of companionship as part of the actual value of the companion 
animal.108 
a. New York  
In computing damages for the death of an eight-year-old dog, the trial 
court in Brousseau v. Rosenthal held that “actual value” to the owner was the 
correct measurement of damages.109 In finding for the plaintiff, who had 
depended greatly on the dog given to her as puppy after she lost her 
husband, the court held that it “must consider [loss of companionship] as an 
element of the dog’s actual value” to the plaintiff.110 To the Brousseau court, 
ignoring the companionship and protection the deceased animal provided to 
the plaintiff would be “wrong.” 111 Brousseau has long been cited as an 
exemplary case modeling the acceptance of damages for loss of 
companionship of a companion animal.112  
 
104 Schwartz & Laird, supra note 17, at 241.  
105 See id. at 242 (calling this method of calculation a “more elastic standard”). 
106  See id. (citing the justification that these factors are “inherently subjective, easily 
inflatable, and potentially astronomical”). 
107 Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 1, at 90; see also Livingston, supra 
note 2, at 819 (“When a pet dies prematurely because of another’s wrongful act, we experience the 
loss of [the companionship of our pet] as a genuine injury.”). 
108  See Huss, Valuation, supra note 48, at 527 (“A few cases have held that loss of 
companionship can be one factor in calculating the actual value of an animal.”); see also Casey 
Chapman, Comment, Not Your Coffee Table: An Evaluation of Companion Animals as Personal 
Property, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 187, 194 (2009) (“Some courts have even gone further and taken a 
more liberal ‘value to the owner’ approach, allowing damages for sentimental or subjective value of 
a pet.”). 
109 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980) (“[T]he fact that Ms. Brousseau’s dog was a 
gift and a mixed breed and thus had no ascertainable market value need not limit [her] recovery to 
a merely nominal award.”). 
110 Id. (“The testimony indicates that plaintiff relied heavily on this well-trained watch dog 
and never went out into the street alone at night without the dog’s protection. Since the dog’s 
death, plaintiff does not go out of her apartment after dark.”). 
111 Id. at 286-87. 
112 See, e.g., Agorianitis, supra note 61, at 1460 (highlighting Brousseau as an example of a 
court allowing loss of companionship damages to a human companion). 
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In calculating damages for a negligently killed Yorkshire terrier, Dexter, 
a New York state court in Mercurio v. Weber embarked on a similar analysis 
as in Brousseau.113 Stating that Brousseau’s analysis was “preferable” to others, 
the court decided that “considering the loss of companionship . . . more 
accurately values the lost animal” and provides for proper compensation.114 
Here, the court accepted the “replacement” price of Dexter offered by 
plaintiff; although the amount ($1513.58) was “substantially higher” than 
Dexter’s purchase price, the court presumed loss of companionship was 
factored into the figure and agreed it was still a reasonable estimate of 
Dexter’s value. 115  Mercurio thus reflects the proposition that loss of 
companionship can be factored into the replacement cost of a companion 
animal.116 
b. Illinois 
A recurring problem in cases of this sort is whether and to what extent the owner of 
an item of personal property having no market value should be allowed to recover 
for the sentimental value which he attached to the item.117  
In the 1987 case of Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hospital, the plaintiffs sued 
to recover damages for loss of companionship after the death of their 
German Shepard due to the negligent administration of anesthesia. 118 
Acknowledging Brousseau, the Jankoski court was unwilling to recognize loss 
of companionship as an independent cause of action but stated that, in 
calculating damages, an object without market value should be measured 
under the “actual value” standard and “may include some element of 
sentimental value.”119 
 
113 No. 1113/03, 2003 WL 21497325, at *2 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. June 20, 2003). 
114 Id. 
115 See id. (“[T]he cost of replacing Dexter . . . is not an unreasonable estimate of Dexter’s 
market value . . . . [T]he record indicates that plaintiff grew highly attached to Dexter, and was 
subsequently deprived of his companionship. Pricing companionship is inherently difficult, but 
since plaintiff has presented us with a figure that reasonably approximates the cost of replacing 
Dexter . . . the court accepts that as the fair market price of Dexter.”).  
116 See Huss, Recent Developments, supra note 93, at 240 (explaining that “the replacement cost 
of the dog encompassed the loss of companionship” in Mercurio). 
117 Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
118 Id. at 1084-85. 
119 Id. at 1087 (hoping to avoid awarding only “nominal” damages to deserving plaintiffs).  
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2. The Rejection of Loss of Companionship Damages Under the Actual 
Value Test and Due to the Property Classification of Animals 
While New York and Illinois courts, in Brousseau, Mercurio, and Jankoski, 
accepted loss of companionship as an element of either actual value or 
replacement value, other courts applying the “actual value” theory of 
recovery have explicitly rejected the recovery of damages for sentimental 
value.120 Instead, these courts factor only “the cost of replacement, money 
spent on veterinary care, training costs, and loss of potential income” into 
damages.121 
a. Ohio 
In McDonald v. Ohio State University Veterinary Hospital, an Ohio court 
dealt with assigning damages for a German Shepherd that suffered paralysis 
after surgery.122 The dog, Nemo, had won awards at various dog shows and 
his pedigree had made him desirable for breeding.123 Deciding that the 
proper test for damages was value to the owner, the court held that 
sentimentality was not a recoverable element under this standard. 124 
Instead, the court took into account the time and money spent training 
Nemo,125 potential lost earnings, and Nemo’s “uniqueness” to conclude the 
plaintiff suffered damages of $5000.126  
b. Alaska 
In Mitchell v. Heinrichs, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that actual 
value to the owner, instead of market value, might sometimes be the proper 
measurement of damages for a companion animal. 127  The court listed 
 
120 See Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 1, at 90 (“Some of these 
courts assessing the actual value of animals have specifically stated that the value does not include 
the subjective emotional or sentimental value of the animal.”); see also Goldberg, supra note 3, at 35 
(“[C]ourts have been clear that [actual or intrinsic value] include[s] only economic factors, not 
sentiment or emotion.”). 
121 Seps, supra note 9, at 1344. 
122 644 N.E.2d 750, 751 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1994). 
123 Id. (noting that Nemo’s puppies earned the plaintiff $350-500 each). 
124 See id. at 752 (“Sentimentality is not a proper element in the determination of damages 
caused to animals.”). 
125 See id. (“Plaintiff invested great time and effort to train Nemo, a unique pedigree, in a 
particular and personalized fashion—the rigorous Schutzhund training.”). 
126 Id. 
127 27 P.3d 309, 310-11, 313 (Alaska 2001) (involving the death of the plaintiff’s dog by 
defendant’s gun shot after the dog threatened the defendant’s livestock and her own personal 
safety). 
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potential items eligible for recovery under this theory: original cost and cost 
of replacement, including cost of immunization, neutering, and training of a 
replacement animal.128 The court held that sentimental value was not a 
component of actual value.129 
c. Texas 
In Petco Animal Supplies v. Schuster, the trial court originally awarded the 
plaintiff $10,000 for “intrinsic value—loss of companionship,” as well as 
additional recovery for mental anguish, emotional distress, and economic 
damages for the loss of her dog, Licorice.130 On appeal, the court decided 
the plaintiff could not recover for loss of companionship. 131  Citing to 
Heiligmann v. Rose, the court held that a plaintiff could only recover the 
market value or “special or pecuniary value to the owner” related to the 
animal’s services.132 Although the court conceded that intrinsic value was “a 
personal or sentimental value,” the intrinsic value of a companion animal 
was confined to the usefulness and services of the animal by Texas 
precedent.133 The court noted: “[W]e are not free to mold Texas law as we 
see fit but must instead follow the precedents of the Texas Supreme Court 
unless and until the high court overrules them or the Texas Legislature 
supersedes them by statute. Thus, we follow Heiligmann . . . .”134 
d. Indiana  
In Lachenman v. Stice, the property classification of companion animals 
hindered the plaintiff from offering evidence regarding the deceased dog’s 
sentimental value.135 While the court accepted that companion animals 
might have “worth” beyond market value, the court ultimately concluded 
that “a dog is personal property, and the measure of damages for the 
 
128 Id. at 313-14.  
129 See id. at 314 (“Mitchell may not recover damages for her dog’s sentimental value as a 
component of actual value to her as the dog’s owner.”). 
130 144 S.W.3d 554, 558 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). 
131 See id. at 560 (“Petco asserts that the district court could not, as a matter of law, award 
Schuster damages for . . . loss of companionship . . . . We agree.”).  
132 Id. at 561 (citing Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 1891)). 
133 Id. at 563-64 (“Schuster relies on Porras v. Craig for the proposition that she can recover 
the intrinsic value of Licorice as a beloved companion. But . . . Heiligmann’s true rule permitted 
recovery of a dog’s special or pecuniary value ascertained solely by reference to the usefulness and 
services of the dog.” (citing Heiligmann, 16 S.W. at 932) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
134 Id. at 565.  
135 See 838 N.E.2d 451, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming that case law does not support 
the plaintiff’s claim that she may recover damages in excess of the fair market value of her dog). 
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destruction of personal property is the fair market value thereof at the time 
of the destruction.” 136  Therefore, a trial court could exclude evidence 
relating to the sentimental value of a companion animal.137 
3. The Acceptance of Other Emotional Damages 
The next two cases, while not specifically addressing loss of 
companionship damages, acknowledged sentimental value and allowed 
plaintiffs to recover noneconomic, emotional damages. Thus, they are 
positively related to this Comment’s purpose. 
a. Florida 
In one of the most well-known companion animal cases, the plaintiff in 
La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc. filed suit after witnessing a garbage 
collector hurl a garbage can at her miniature dachshund, inflicting injuries 
from which the dog died.138 After the trial judge instructed the jury that the 
plaintiff could recover for mental suffering from the incident, the Florida 
Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether the trial court erred 
in giving out these instructions.139 The court rejected the District Court of 
Appeal’s remarks that sentimental value had no place in damages 
calculations and reinstated the original judgment. 140  Writing that “the 
affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing and . . .  the malicious 
destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for which the owner 
should recover,”141 the court held that the plaintiff could recover for mental 
suffering as an element of her damages.142 
 
136 Id. at 467. 
137 See id. at 467-68 (“A family dog may well have sentimental value . . . [but] we cannot 
say that the trial court’s ruling . . . was in error.”). 
138 163 So. 2d 267, 267-68 (Fla. 1964). 
139 Id. at 267.  
140 Id. at 268-69. 
141 Id. at 269 (“The restriction of the loss of a pet to its intrinsic value in circumstances such 
as the ones before us is a principle we cannot accept.”).  
142 Id.; see Byszewski, supra note 101, at 219-20 (“The court’s holding recognized that 
companion animals do have special value, unlike traditional property, based on the value their 
guardians appropriately place on them.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The judgment 
reinstated by the Florida Supreme Court was for $2000 in compensatory damages, “primarily 
emotional in nature,” and $1000 in punitive damages. William A. Reppy, Jr., Punitive Damage 
Awards in Pet-Death Cases: How do the Ratio Rules of State Farm v. Campbell Apply?, 1 J. ANIMAL 
L. & ETHICS 19, 30 (2006). 
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b. Hawaii 
A Hawaiian circuit court in Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station 
awarded the grieving family of a negligently killed dog $1000 in damages, 
which included recovery for emotional distress. 143  On appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii, defendant argued the plaintiffs could not recover 
for mental injury from the loss of personal property.144 Admitting that it 
was following a minority view, the court rejected this argument, stating that 
a plaintiff could recover for mental distress due to the “negligent 
destruction of property,” and upheld the original damages award. 145 
Campbell reflects the coexistence of an unlikely pairing: the property 
classification of companion animals and the approval of emotional 
compensation.146  
IV. THE MINORITY TREND: ARGUMENTS FOR EXPANDING LOSS OF 
COMPANIONSHIP DAMAGES TO COVER COMPANION ANIMALS 
[A] pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a 
person and a piece of personal property.147  
This Part addresses three major arguments in support of the minority 
position and the expansion of tort law to allow the recovery of loss of 
companionship damages for a companion animal. 
A. Expansion Promotes the Goals of Tort Law  
Three major goals of tort law are to deter wrongful conduct, compensate 
victims, and reflect society’s values.148 First, to deter potential wrongdoers, 
the law must present a punishment harsh enough to evoke deterrence. Tort 
law will not deter wrongful conduct toward companion animals unless 
 
143 632 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Haw. 1981). 
144 Id. at 1071; Root, supra note 77, at 433-34. 
145 Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1071 (“Hawaii has devised a unique approach to the area of recovery 
for mental distress.”).  
146 See Root, supra note 77, at 434 (“This case might be used as a springboard for other courts 
to adopt the same or similar legal reasoning to expand the damages recoverable for the wrongful 
injury to or death of a companion animal.”). 
147 Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979). 
148  See Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1099 (listing “compensation, deterrence, and the 
reflection of societal values” as tort law’s three objectives); see also Boxberger, supra note 13, at 142 
(“Two of the main objectives of tort law are the affirmation of societal values and the 
compensation for people’s injuries.”).  
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courts appropriately value the animal.149 An appropriate valuation must 
involve emotional harm; without it, plaintiffs will recover negligible 
damages under both the fair market value and actual value standards, which 
will not deter future wrongdoers. Economic deterrence functions successfully 
only if compensation is high enough to curb the punishable conduct. For 
companion animals, compensation therefore must include emotional 
damages, including loss of companionship.150 
Second, to properly compensate tort victims for their actual loss, courts 
must award loss of companionship damages. Fair market value is not a 
sufficient measurement of damages for the true loss suffered by human 
companions.151 Proponents demand that the unique relationship humans 
have with their companion animals requires greater compensation than that 
given for the damage or destruction to other forms of property: “[T]he most 
fundamental rule of damages [is] that every wrongful injury or loss . . . 
should be adequately and reasonably compensated[,] requir[ing] . . . 
compensation for the reasonable special value of such articles to their owner 
taking into consideration the feelings of the owner for the property.”152 
Human companions suffer emotional distress, grief, depression, and loss of 
society when their companion animal is injured or killed. 153  The loss 
experienced is “substantial and genuine,” and studies have found this 
emotional distress is similar to that experienced when a human family 
member dies.154 These are real harms that deserve emotional damages for 
plaintiffs to recover fully for their injury.155 Without such recognition, the 
 
149 See Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1087 (“Appropriately valuing companion animals . . . results 
in deterrence by reducing consumption.”).  
150 See id. at 1086 (“[E]conomic deterrence requires compensation for emotional harm . . . .”). 
151 See id. at 1062-63 (“Market value is incommensurate with the loss suffered by animal 
guardians because the market value of a cat or dog, neither pedigreed nor kept for a purpose other 
than love and affection, is negligible.”).  
152 Wise, supra note 32, at 66. 
153  See id. at 39 (“[A]n overarching principle of tort law is that victims should be 
compensated for all damages proximately caused by a tortfeasor’s wrongful conduct; human 
companions suffer proximately caused emotional distress and loss of society when their companion 
animals are wrongfully killed; therefore, owners should be compensated for this emotional distress 
and loss of society.”); see also Martin, supra note 40, at 941 (“Owners . . . can be expected to go 
through all of the classic stages of grief when their pets die, including denial, bargaining, anger, 
guilt, sorrow, and resolution.”).  
154 Livingston, supra note 2, at 806 (“Upon a pet’s death, humans generally experience a 
substantial and genuine loss . . . .”); Pintar, supra note 1, at 741 (“Individuals grieving over the 
loss of a pet will experience the same symptoms as those grieving over the loss of a person, though 
not necessarily to the same degree.”).  
155 See Boxberger, supra note 13, at 142 (“Michigan’s refusal to compensate companion animal 
guardians for loss of companionship for the loss of a companion animal is a failure to compensate 
for a very real and devastating injury.”); id. at 150 (“That destruction and loss is evident by the 
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law “awards damages for a loss that the owner of a companion animal does 
not actually suffer (economic value) and refuses to compensate an owner for 
the damages that [he or she] actually does suffer (emotional distress and loss 
of society).”156  
The third goal of tort law is to reflect society’s values.157 Proponents 
argue that the current law does not reflect society’s attitudes: people do not 
view their companion animals as property.158 Studies indicate that many 
human companions view their companion animals as members of the family, 
with some even viewing their beloved animals as akin to children. 159 
Furthermore, the idea that society values companion animals as more than 
property is reflected by the concept of “replacement.” One standard of tort 
compensation for property harm is awarding the plaintiff the cost of 
replacement. However, a companion animal is irreplaceable, and the actions 
of a human companion after his or her loss do not match those of a person 
dealing with damaged or destroyed property. 160  With other forms of 
property, when the item is rendered useless, the owner seeks to replace it, 
an act that makes the owner “whole again.” However, purchasing a new 
companion animal does not make the human companion whole.161 Even 
more telling, if companion animals were viewed like property, the animal 
would be replaced once the cost of upkeep surpassed the animal’s market 
value. However, the opposite occurs: human companions see their animals 
as more valuable as they age and will pay to keep the animal alive as long as 
possible.162  
 
extreme pain felt by the human companion.”); see also Chapman, supra note 108, at 203 (“[I]t is 
illogical to hold the innocent party responsible for any losses incurred due to the negligence of the 
offending party.”). 
156 Wise, supra note 32, at 72. 
157 See Huss, Valuation, supra note 48, at 530 (“The law should reflect the values of society.”).  
158 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Some proponents go as far as to say companion 
animals should be treated as persons under the law. See Seps, supra note 9, at 1358 (“Since society 
treats pets like humans, the law should treat this group of animals as persons.”).  
159 DeFabritiis, supra note 12, at 241-42; see also Livingston, supra note 2, at 802 (“[A]nimals 
are now often regarded as members of the family and esteemed for the love, loyalty, and 
companionship that they provide.”). 
160 Cf. Wilson, supra note 13, at 196 (noting that a companion animal is of “irreplaceable 
value” to the human companion). 
161 See Livingston, supra note 2, at 817 (“[P]rocuring a new animal will not erase the mental 
anguish and grief experienced when the previous animal was killed.”). 
162 See Seps, supra note 9, at 1365 (“[A]s pets age they become more valuable to their owners 
as a result of having spent more time with their owners and thus developing a closer emotional 
relationship with them.”); see also Simmons, supra note 3, at 265 (“If animals were truly seen as 
property[,] veterinarians and other animal healthcare providers would be nonexistent. Pet owners 
would not need their services because they would simply abandon their pets and replace 
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B. Expansion Is a Natural Next Step 
In many ways, allowing for the recovery of loss of companionship 
damages under tort law makes sense as the next natural development in the 
law. Over time, more relationships have been declared eligible to receive 
loss of companionship damages.163 Currently, the common law and state 
statutes conflict with how the public views and values companion animals. 
To address this inconsistency, states must recognize loss of companionship 
damages for human companions.164 “As long as tort law compensates for 
emotional losses stemming from other relationships, it should compensate 
for emotional losses stemming from the death of companion animals.”165 
C. Expansion Is Rational Because Companion Animals Already Receive 
Protection Unique to “Property” Under the Law  
Although classified as property, animals receive various forms of 
protection under U.S. law, which differentiates them from other forms of 
property. For example, animals receive unique protection though animal 
cruelty and welfare laws.166 The Animal Welfare Act of 1966 was enacted in 
part to “insure that animals intended for use inside research 
facilities . . . or . . . as pets are provided humane care and treatment” and 
“assure the humane treatment of animals during transportation in 
commerce.”167 As author Debra Squires-Lee argues in her 1995 article, In 
Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, “[i]f 
animals were truly property, there would be little reason for Congress to 
pass such a law protecting their interests . . . .”168 Squires-Lee also notes 
that all fifty states have passed laws criminalizing animal cruelty, torture, 
the overworking of animals, and the deprivation of necessary sustenance.169 
 
them . . . rather than seeking treatment.” (quoting Paek, supra note 36, at 489) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
163 See supra Part II. 
164 See Kirk, supra note 33, at 131 (“[I]t is time for the courts to recognize that many members 
of society have emotional bonds with their companion animals.”); see also Boxberger, supra note 13, 
at 150 (“Michigan is willing to award loss of companionship damages for the loss of a family member 
and any break up in the family unit. Accordingly, Michigan must award loss of companionship 
damages for the loss of a companion animal. Not allowing such damages is hypocritical and 
unjust.”).  
165 Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1082-83. 
166 See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 45 (pointing out that animal cruelty and welfare laws show 
that companion animals are valued even though they are classified as legal property).  
167 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2012). 
168 Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1072.  
169 See id. at 1071-72 (“[T]he legislatures of the fifty states have essentially acknowledged that 
animals are more than property and more than inanimate objects.”). 
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The protection of companion animals in these respects fundamentally 
conflicts with the lack of recovery for emotional damages under tort law.170 
V. PROMOTING THE MINORITY VIEW: APPROACHES TO EXPANDING 
TORT RECOVERY TO INCLUDE LOSS OF COMPANIONSHIP  
DAMAGES TO HUMAN COMPANIONS 
For those supporting the growing minority view, two approaches are 
often proposed to change the law. First, the legal status of companion 
animals must be elevated from pure property to a semi-property 
classification more attuned with the realities of companion animals’ 
characteristics and their relationships with their human companions. 
Second, tort law itself must expand to allow for the recovery of loss of 
companionship damages to human companions.  
Advocates of the minority position encourage one or both of these 
proposed solutions and, in many cases, the two solutions are proposed 
together. Each proposal approaches the issue from a different angle; the first 
focuses on the legal classification of companion animals, and the second on 
the expansion of accepted tort recovery. This Comment advocates for the 
use of both solutions to allow human companions to recover loss of 
companionship damages. Used together, these reforms will allow the 
classification of companion animals in a manner more consistent with 
societal values, and human companions will receive damages properly 
compensating them for their loss. However, for the purpose of clarity, these 
two approaches will be discussed in separate Sections.  
 
170 See Seps, supra note 9, at 1343 (“[T]he law’s treatment of animals differs based on the area 
of law in which the animal is considered.”). On a similar note, in arguing that expanding recovery 
for the loss of companionship of a companion animal is justified even under a property 
classification, comparisons can be drawn to the treatment of corporations under U.S. law. The 
U.S. Supreme Court gave corporations “corporate personality” by deciding that they were “a kind 
of person and resident of a state” and therefore should receive state citizenship. See Huss, Valuing 
Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 1, at 71-72. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 
Chief Justice Marshall expressed a caveat: “[b]eing the mere creature of law, [a corporation] 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . .” 17 U.S. 
518, 636 (1819). Similarly, allowing for recovery of emotional damages for companion animals can 
be restricted solely to that specific purpose, as a creature of statutory or common law. If 
corporations are viewed as legal “persons”—although technically they are not—then companion 
animals, though property, can be viewed as entities for which the recovery of emotional damages 
by their human companions is allowed if they are damaged or destroyed.  
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A. Where Should Change Occur? Advocating for the Legislature 
The first obstacle to both approaches is how to make the necessary legal 
change. However, the answer is quite clear: the change must come from the 
legislature. While more courts are expressing sympathy for claimants by 
recognizing the real loss felt by human companions and acknowledging 
changing social attitudes, legal precedent ties their hands.171 Scholars noted 
that “judges are extremely reluctant to adopt any approach that radically 
contradicts centuries of well-developed jurisprudence.”172 Many opinions 
expressly state that courts are helpless to extend loss of companionship 
damages to worthy plaintiffs without proper legal action by their state’s 
legislature.173 This position is valid for many reasons. The legislature can 
weigh policy considerations,174 structure laws that properly address social 
needs, 175  and speak to opposing arguments 176  when enacting a statute. 
Statutory action will moreover enact change faster than if made through the 
judiciary.177 
 
171 See DeFabritiis, supra note 12, at 238, 247-48 (“Recent decisions indicate that the judiciary 
is ready for the legislature to step in and provide an avenue by which the courts may grant non-
economic damages.”). 
172 Wilson, supra note 13, at 183.  
173 See Pickford v. Masion, 98 P.3d 1232, 1235 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (“[Plaintiff], with good 
reason, maintains that [his dog] is much more than a piece of property; we agree. Still, no 
Washington case has recognized the claims Pickford urges us to find. Such an extension of duty 
and liability is more appropriately made by the legislature.”); see also Naples v. Miller, 08C-01-
093, 2009 WL 1163504, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2009) (explaining that these issues are “up 
to the Legislature, not the Courts”); DeFabritiis, supra note 12, at 253 (“Absent action by the 
legislature, the court [in Scheele v. Dustin, 998 A.2d 697 (Vt. 2010)] was left to rely on outdated 
precedent that categorized a companion animal as property for which the sole measure of damages 
is its fair market value.”).  
174 See Livingston, supra note 2, at 793-94 (“[T]he legislature is the appropriate body to 
fashion such a remedy and to weigh the competing policy considerations.”). 
175 See Wilson, supra note 13, at 194 (“Legislatures are . . . able to structure laws around the 
current needs of society.”). 
176 Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room Sofa: Changing the Legal Status of Companion Animals, 
4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 314, 389 (2007) (“[L]egislation can . . . address the concerns of 
those who seem most opposed . . . .”). 
177  See Root, supra note 77, at 448 (“[Such] statutes could preempt the settled case 
law . . . .”). Furthermore, the legislative path was used to enact wrongful death statutes, another 
significant shift in tort law. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 59 (“[A] liability expansion of this 
magnitude should be made through legislatures, just as with wrongful death acts for spouses and 
children.”). 
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B. A Special Status of Companion Animals: Creating a  
Unique Semi-Property Classification 
1. A New Semi-Property Classification  
The first popular solution encouraged by those supporting the recovery 
of loss of companionship damages to human companions involves replacing 
the legal property status of companion animals with a new classification.178 
Proponents argue that the law should reflect society’s recognition of 
companion animals as sentient, emotive, and capable of forming real bonds 
with their human companions.179 Therefore, companion animals deserve to 
be separated from other forms of personal property to reflect these unique 
characteristics.180 
Most scholars supporting this line of thought propose to classify 
companion animals as a special, distinct segment of legal property. While the 
name of the new classification may vary—from “companion animal 
property” 181  to “sentient property” 182  or “inimitable property” 183 —the 
category recognizes what makes companion animals different from other 
 
178 Proponents of this solution believe that “property” is an inadequate and incorrect 
categorization of companion animals because it fails to take into account the relationship between 
the animal and the human companion and the value the human companion places upon the 
animal. See Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001) (“Labeling a dog 
property fails to describe the value human beings place upon the companionship that they enjoy 
with a dog.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The property classification essentially compares 
a companion animal to any other piece of personal property—considering it no more or no less 
than a table or a chair. But see id. (“A companion dog is not a fungible item, equivalent to other 
items of personal property. A companion dog is not a living room sofa or dining room 
furniture.”). 
179 Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of “Non-Economic” Damages for Wrongful 
Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 ANIMAL L. 45, 55 (2001). 
As mentioned in previous Parts, many human companions see their companion animals as family 
members. See Seps, supra note 9, at 1370 (describing custody disputes and tort cases concerning 
companion animals). 
180 Hankin, supra note 176, at 377; see also Wilson, supra note 13, at 187 (“Companion animals’ 
unique qualities and unique ability to straddle the line between family member and chattel 
require[] a unique classification in property law . . . .”). Furthermore, altering the classification 
of companion animals will “help to make sense of [the minority] judicial and legislative trends that 
have been emerging in the past decade or more.” Hankin, supra note 176, at 380. 
181 Hankin, supra note 176, at 379. 
182  Id. at 385-86 (reviewing one definition of sentient property: “any warm blooded, 
domesticated nonhuman animal dependent on one or more humans for food, shelter, veterinary 
care, or compassion and typically kept in or near the household of its owner, guardian, or keeper” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Sullivan & Vietzke, supra note 19, at 44 (“Sentient 
property has the capacity to feel pain . . . .”). 
183 Wilson, supra note 13, at 170-71. 
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types of property.184 This includes taking into account their “dependence on 
their human owners, their capacity to suffer if mistreated or neglected, and 
the bonds that we form with [them] and that they form with us.”185  
One of the most important questions involving this unique property 
classification is which animals will fall within its reach. Tennessee’s T-Bo 
Act covers only domesticated dogs and cats and has been criticized for the 
seemingly arbitrary line it draws between these companion animals and 
others.186 The Animal Legal Defense Fund takes a more inclusive approach, 
defining companion animal as a “warm-blooded, domesticated nonhuman 
animal” that depends on a person for “food, shelter, veterinary care, or 
companionship.”187 Nevertheless, many proponents still limit their semi-
property classifications to dogs and cats,188 perhaps to diffuse oppositional 
arguments claiming the new classification is too expansive and would lead to 
extreme results.  
2. Oppositional Arguments and Responses in Rebuttal  
As with any proposal for change, a new semi-property classification for 
companion animals has its critics. This subsection will address common 
arguments against a new property status for companion animals and will 
respond to them. 
First, opponents argue that the current property classification is the 
correct categorization of companion animals under the law. Over a century’s 
worth of precedent reflects that, under common law, animals are classified as 
property. As the Indiana Court of Appeals noted in Lachenman v. Stice, 
“[h]owever unfeeling it may seem, the bottom line is that a dog is personal 
property . . . .”189 The law has consistently treated all animals as property; 
to change the legal status of only some animals would result in undesirable 
and inconsistent treatment of the same species of animal depending on the 
 
184 See Hankin, supra note 176, at 381 (“Creating a new legal category for companion 
animals . . . recognizes their important differences from inanimate property . . . .”). 
185 Id. at 379.  
186 See Agorianitis, supra note 61, at 1467-68 (“While it is true that dogs and cats are the most 
common type of companion animal, the statutory limitation of the definition of ‘pet’ is an 
arbitrary distinction that wrongfully excludes [other] relationships . . . .”); see also Root, supra 
note 77, at 448 (“The statute should include a broader definition of ‘pet’ because humans can form 
companion relationships with animals besides dogs and cats, including birds and rabbits.”).  
187 Sonia S. Waisman, Non-Economic Damages: Where Does it Get Us and How Do We Get 
There?, 1 J. ANIMAL L. 7, 20 (2005). 
188 See Hankin, supra note 176, at 386 (proposing a “companion animal property category” 
limited to dogs and cats). 
189 838 N.E.2d 451, 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
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situation.190 Furthermore, opponents argue that such a change will interfere 
with the scientific research community’s ability to use these species of 
animals in their research.191  
In rebuttal, proponents of a new classification for companion animals 
argue that the property classification is outdated and does not accurately 
reflect the way human companions and society in general view companion 
animals.192 Differential treatment of animals in specific legal contexts is 
both commonplace and desirable.193 Currently, there are certain U.S. laws 
that provide differential treatment to some animals based on their species, 
while other laws treat the same animal species differently depending on 
circumstance.194 Distinctive laws are applied to wild animals, livestock, 
companion animals, and animals used for research.195 For example, the 
Animal Welfare Act includes different provisions and restrictions depending 
on whether an animal is used in research, as livestock, or as a pet.196 
Moreover, changes to the property classification of companion animals can 
be written in a way to only impact domesticated, household pets, and not 
members of the same species kept and used for research.197 Creating a legal 
classification that gives certain animals a different status and protection in 
certain situations is not out of the ordinary.  
Second, opponents warn that any progressive development away from 
the strict property classification of companion animals is the first step 
towards granting companion animals a “legal status akin to personhood,” a 
 
190 See Seps, supra note 9, at 1340 (“The law attempts to maintain consistency in its treatment 
of all animals as property . . . .”). 
191 See Hankin, supra note 176, at 389 (arguing, in rebuttal, that narrowly defining the change 
to the status of companion animals could alleviate opposition from the research community). 
192 See id. at 377, 379-80 (“A separate legal category for companion animals has both intuitive 
appeal and would better reflect the way in which we value companion animals in our society.”); 
Schwartz & Laird, supra note 17, at 235 (emphasizing the unique value humans place on 
companion animals); Kirk, supra note 33, at 129 (“The law must acknowledge that for many people 
losing a pet is emotionally devastating.”). 
193 See Seps, supra note 9, at 1340 (“Different laws apply to different animals based on their 
categorization as wild animals, livestock, research animals, or pets.”). See generally Hankin, supra 
note 176. 
194 See Seps, supra note 9, at 1340 (“Different categorization of animals, and thus the 
application of laws to different animal groups, is based on humanity’s relationship with the 
animals.”). 
195 See id. (“[A]nimal torture laws do not apply to the treatment of wild animals while 
hunting, fishing, or trapping.”). 
196 See id. (“In addition, specific laws apply to the killing of livestock, whereas other laws exit 
that govern the killing of pets in shelters.”). 
197 Of course, this argument depends on the specific language used in the new semi-property 
classification of companion animals. See supra subsection V.B.1. Other issues surrounding animal 
research are beyond the scope of this Comment.  
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situation challengers strictly oppose.198 Strengthening this position, some 
proposals recommend the law should grant a narrow class of animals 
personhood status,199 and the relationship between a human and a companion 
animal should be treated similarly to a custodial parent–child relationship.200  
However, classifying companion animals as “semi-property” will not 
bring such dramatic results. As mentioned in Section V.A., changes to the 
property status of companion animals should be effectuated by state 
legislatures, not through the courts or common law. This way, legislatures 
can specifically clarify which companion animals are covered, what 
protections they will receive, and under what circumstances they can be 
legally classified as semi-property. Acting through the legislature will 
guarantee that the new legal classification reflects societal values and 
addresses policy concerns, including those voiced by the opposition. The 
legislature can also ensure that companion animals are not given 
“personhood” status or other rights normally granted only to human beings. 
C. A New Subset of Loss of Companionship Damages Claims 
1. Description of a New Recovery Statute 
A second proposal looks to expand tort law to allow human companions 
to recover loss of companionship damages. To do so, advocates suggest state 
legislatures should follow the lead of the Tennessee T-Bo Act and enact 
statutes that expressly expand loss of companionship damages to cover 
injured or killed companion animals. To create a successful statute, a 
legislature must first address questions such as who can sue and for what 
acts, which animals are covered, what factors should be analyzed in deciding 
the financial award, will there be a cap on damages and what should it be, 
and will there be any exceptions? This subsection will offer answers to these 
questions. 
First, the statute should expressly limit its application to specific 
individuals. In many cases, a companion animal is a “family pet” who bonds 
with multiple family members. In order to eliminate the likelihood of 
 
198 See Hankin, supra note 176, at 381 (noting that some advocate that animals should have a 
status analogous to people); see also Agorianitis, supra note 61, at 1466 (“One of the biggest 
concerns with the abrogation of animals’ status as property has been the idea that the elimination 
of that status will lead to granting animals independent rights as individuals . . . .”). 
199 See Seps, supra note 9, at 1369 (confining those animals the law should treat as persons to 
“anthropomorphic pets”). 
200 Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 1, at 69. 
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repetitive claims and excessive damages awards,201 some have argued that 
only one claimant should be able to claim loss of companionship damages 
either by representing himself or herself (if he or she is the sole owner of 
the companion animal or the household does not include other human 
companions) or, in the case of a family, as a “family unit.”202  
Next, the statute would need to clarify which outcomes and acts would 
occasion loss of companionship damages. The range of options includes 
injuries not claiming the life of the pet, injuries resulting in death, or the 
killing of the companion animal (as well as negligent or intentional acts). 
For example, the T-Bo Act only covers companion animals that were killed 
or sustained injuries resulting in death,203 while other proposed statutes 
allow for recovery for injuries that do not result in death.204 Most believe 
recovery should apply to both negligent and intentional acts,205 while some 
demand additional requirements for negligence or gross negligence when 
“the [injurious or fatal act] . . . occur[red] on the property of the deceased 
pet’s owner or caretaker, or while under the control and supervision of the 
deceased pet’s owner or caretaker.”206  
Next, the statute must identify which animals are to be considered 
“companion animals.” As discussed in subsection V.B.1, many statutes either 
limit the category of recoverable companion animals to just dogs and cats207 
or warm-blooded, domesticated nonhuman animals dependent on their 
owners,208 to the exclusion of livestock or farm animals.209 
 
201 A popular oppositional argument is that multiple claimants will sue for a singular event 
involving the same companion animal causing an increase in court caseloads and excessive 
overcompensation. See Livingston, supra note 2, at 843 (mentioning the concern that “in a single 
family several claimants will come forward and seek noneconomic damages, . . . resulting in 
possible overcompensation”). 
202 See Chapman, supra note 108, at 222 (“[T]he family unit . . . shall recover as one 
companion animal owner . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
203 TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(1) (West 2014); see also Roukas, supra note 2, at 57 
(proposing legislation allowing for recovery only if an animal is killed or its injuries result in 
death). 
204 See Chapman, supra note 108, at 223-24 (proposing a model statute for recovery). Others 
believe recovery should be limited to only those injuries that are “severe.” See DeFabritiis, supra 
note 12, at 264 (“[A]ctionable conduct should include both intentional and negligent acts or 
omissions that result in the severe injury or death of a companion animal.”). 
205 DeFabritiis, supra note 12, at 264.  
206 Roukas, supra note 2, at 57; see also Chapman, supra note 108, at 223 (requiring the same 
criteria for negligent action). The T-Bo Act also includes a similar provision. See TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(1). 
207 TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(b); see Chapman, supra note 108, at 202 (“[R]ecovery 
should be limited to those animals that are traditionally kept and recognized as companion 
animals, and which are capable of both giving and receiving affection—namely cats and dogs.”). 
208 DeFabritiis, supra note 12, at 264. 
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Furthermore, if damages for the loss of companionship of a companion 
animal were allowed, how would a court decide if the plaintiff deserved 
recovery, and for what amount? While guidelines would help courts apply 
the law, claims would need to be viewed on a case-by-case basis to 
determine the nature of each particular animal–human relationship.210 Since 
the theory behind recovery is that human companions suffer a real loss of 
companionship when their companion animal dies, plaintiffs will first have 
to sufficiently show that they suffered a legally recognizable loss due to the 
injury to or death of their companion animals.  
Many suggest that courts ought to require extensive testimony on the 
companionship between the plaintiff and the companion animal sufficient to 
establish the bond that existed between the two.211 Plaintiffs should introduce 
evidence on the nature of the relationship,212 including testimony on its 
duration, any special training or distinctive uses of the animal, the animal’s 
unique personality, the animal’s participation in family activities, and the 
general family-type attachment to the animal.213 The court should also take 
note of special circumstances enhancing the human companion’s 
dependence on the animal and the human–companion animal bond. For 
example, the plaintiff in Mercurio v. Weber purchased her companion 
animals to provide comfort and companionship after she lost her husband on 
September 11.214 Similarly, in Morgan v. Kroupa, the court emphasized how 
 
209 However, some argue that drawing the line at farm animals is also arbitrary as an 
increasing number of people keep farm animals as pets. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 48 (“[W]ith 
many communities increasingly permitting farm animals as pets, drawing a line even broadly at 
companion animals can be exceedingly difficult.”). Susan L. Hankin, in Not a Living Room Sofa, 
proposes a solution to this problem. Hankin suggests that “companion animals” should include 
only defined species, initially including only cats and dogs. See Hankin, supra note 176, at 386-87. 
However, the definition of “companion animal” would also include a mechanism to add other 
species under its label if certain criteria are met. Id.  
210 See Wilson, supra note 13, at 193 (noting the process courts use for valuing pets after their 
injury or destruction “will be . . . judged on a case-by-case basis”); see also Seps, supra note 9, at 
1370 (“[C]ourts should consider the circumstances of each pet-owner relationship . . . .”).  
211 See Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases: Recognizing Pets’ 
Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31, 46-47 (2001) (“Courts 
should demand to hear testimony as to the companionship value of a particular pet.”); see also 
Martin, supra note 40, at 951-52 (“[A] court must be cautious of inviting frivolous or fraudulent 
claims . . . [and thus] extensive proof . . . should be required of plaintiffs.”). 
212 See Livingston, supra note 2, at 837 (recommending plaintiffs to “establish the depth and 
duration of their relationship with the decedent and the specific ways in which they were 
connected to the decedent and are now deprived of his/her companionship and society”). 
213 See Wilson, supra note 13, at 194 (listing a variety of factors courts could consider with 
these claims). 
214 No. 1113/03, 2003 WL 21497325, at *1 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. June 20, 2003).  
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the plaintiff had his dog since he was a puppy.215 Courts must be confident 
of the degree to which a plaintiff suffered grief and loss to ensure that the 
injury is as severe as the plaintiff claims.216 
Another important inquiry involves capping damages awards. Many 
advocate for a cap on loss of companionship (or other emotional) damages 
to guarantee uniform awards, prohibit excessive recovery or jury over-
sympathy, match recovery to the real loss at hand, and pay respect to the 
belief that the loss of a companion animal does not validate awards 
equivalent to the loss of a spouse, child, or parent.217  
While most advocates agree damages should be limited, there is little 
consensus on what the exact cap should be. Proposals for a statutory cap on 
emotional or noneconomic damages have suggested $15,000,218 $25,000,219 
and $100,000 cap amounts.220 The most notorious statute allowing for loss of 
companionship damages, the T-Bo Act, caps noneconomic damages for the 
loss of “expected society, companionship, love and affection” at $5000.221 
Advocates for increased damages awards argue low caps, like the T-Bo Act’s 
cap, will “detract lawyers from accepting cases,”222 are not well thought-out 
(given the high cost of litigation),223 and do not appropriately punish the 
defendant or compensate the plaintiff.224  
Next, should specific individuals be exempt from the reach of such 
statutes? Veterinarians are major opponents of noneconomic damages 
recovery, and rightfully so, as allowing it would dramatically increase 
financial verdicts against them and animal hospitals for veterinary 
malpractice or negligence. Veterinarians also argue that such a change would 
negatively impact pet owners because veterinarians would be forced to 
 
215 702 A.2d 630, 631 (Vt. 1997) (emphasizing the duration of the relationship). 
216 See Chapman, supra note 108, at 215 (“[L]egislatures can . . . require a high burden of 
proof to insure that plaintiffs’ injuries are actually as severe as they may claim.”). 
217 See Livingston, supra note 2, at 827-28 (“A cap would [] send a message that although the 
human-animal bond is worthy of significant compensation . . . the bonds among humans are 
[still] at the heart of our existence and social organization.”). 
218 Chapman, supra note 108, at 223. 
219 Roukas, supra note 2, at 57. 
220  See Martin, supra note 40, at 953 (citing a 2003 Colorado bill capping loss of 
companionship damages at $100,000). 
221 TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(1), (c), (d) (West 2014). 
222 Wilson, supra note 13, at 195. 
223 Root, supra note 77, at 448 (arguing that a cap of $4000 for noneconomic damages is 
“extremely low considering the amount of damages awarded in modern courts and because of high 
litigation costs”). 
224 See Chapman, supra note 108, at 214-15 (“[ J]uries and courts are able to assess damages 
awards that reflect the culpability of the defendant, and therefore, they can limit, or ‘cap,’ the 
damages as appropriate.”). 
  
1234 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1199 
 
change practices, perform “defensive medicine,” and potentially increase 
prices to account for liability costs and increases in veterinary insurance.225 
Therefore, opponents of these laws advocate for the complete exemption of 
veterinarians from liability. 226  The T-Bo Act explicitly states its 
inapplicability to licensed veterinarians in professional negligence actions as 
well as to not-for-profit organizations and government entities and 
employees acting for the public health or animal welfare.227 Deciding which 
individuals or entities should be exempt and under what conditions is 
another task best suited for legislatures.  
2. Oppositional Arguments and Responses in Rebuttal 
Expanding tort law recovery to allow the recovery of loss of 
companionship damages for the injury to or death of a companion animal is 
not without opposition. One of the most common arguments against such 
expansion rests on the idea that if damages for loss of companionship are 
awarded for certain companion animals, they will soon be available for other 
animals as well.  
If we are to allow recovery for an injured or killed dog or cat, why not 
also allow it for a rabbit, hamster, snake, or lizard?228 In holding that a 
plaintiff could not recover emotional distress damages for her deceased dog, 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin warned that “[h]umans have an enormous 
capacity to form bonds with dogs, cats, birds, and an infinite number of 
other beings that are non-human. Were we to recognize a claim . . . [here], 
we can find little basis for rationally distinguishing other categories of 
animal companion.”229 Bringing the argument further, what about domestic 
 
225 Huss, Valuation, supra note 48, at 531; see also Schwartz & Laird, supra note 17, at 261 (“As 
a result of the increasing exposure of veterinarians to liability, the costs of veterinary insurance are 
likely to rise.”).  
226 One author suggests exempting veterinarians from liability for professional negligence 
but not for gross negligence. Chapman, supra note 108, at 221. 
227 TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(e) (West 2014). Other proposed statutory schemes 
include language similar to that found in the T-Bo Act. See Chapman, supra note 108, at 224 
(proposing a model statute with a provision, similar to the Tennessee statute, which explicitly 
excludes its application to not-for-profit organizations and government agencies or employees 
acting to benefit public health or animal welfare but does not include veterinarians as an exempt 
class of individuals).  
228 See Chapman, supra note 108, at 216 (“[I]f courts allow recovery for injured cats or dogs, 
then they will have to allow recovery for injured turtles, fish, squirrels or other animals.”).  
229 Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Wis. 2001). The court asserted that 
public policy rests on the side of denying emotional recovery, questioning how lines would be 
drawn concerning who could receive damages as a human companion and what species of animals 
would be permitted. Id. at 802 (“[T]he public policy concerns . . . compel the conclusion 
that . . . Rabideau cannot maintain a claim . . . .”). 
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farm animals? Opponents contend that the fair market standard is the 
proper form of recovery for animals whose worth is primarily economic.230 
If recovery for companion animals were to be based on sentimental value, 
then recovery for all animals should be based on sentimental value and this 
standard would incorrectly remedy owners of domestic farm animals.  
In rebuttal, proponents argue that laws limiting recovery to certain 
species of companion animals reflect the views of society and public policy 
and therefore would not be expanded unless further legislative action was 
deemed necessary.231 In essence, the legislature would act as a gatekeeper, 
deciding whether public policy and societal values dictate expanding the 
definition of “companion animal” to include a greater number of species. 
Without further legislative action, animals with primarily economic worth, 
like domesticated farm animals, would still be evaluated under the fair 
market value standard. However, “[s]imply because people can form bonds 
with an infinite number of other beings does not mean that plaintiffs should 
be prohibited from recovering [for certain animal relationships].”232  
On a somewhat similar note, what effect would opening the doors to loss 
of companionship damages for companion animals have on recovery for 
other inanimate forms of personal property? 233  Opponents argue that 
allowing recovery for loss of companionship damages for companion 
animals legally classified as property under the law would mean that 
plaintiffs will soon be able to recover such damages for other lost or 
destroyed property items holding sentimental or emotional value, such as 
heirlooms.234 
 
230 See Huss, Valuation, supra note 48, at 533 (“The value of food producing animals appears 
to be adequately measured under the current system.”); see also Livingston, supra note 2, at 802-03 
(“[M]any domestic animals, such as cattle, sheep, and chickens, are still valued primarily for their 
economic worth . . . .”). 
231 See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 108, at 216 (noting that this issue can be addressed by 
defining the animals covered by the statute). 
232 Id. at 202 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
233 See Mark Sadler, Comment, Can the Injured Pet Owner Look to Liability Insurance for 
Satisfaction of a Judgment? The Coverage Implications of Damages for the Injury or Death of a Companion 
Animal, 11 ANIMAL L. 283, 287 (2005) (“The rationale for [the reluctance to award damages for 
emotional distress] has been based upon a fear that recognition of these damages would open 
unlimited possibilities with regard to other items of personal property.”). 
234 Cf. Mercurio v. Weber, No. 1113/03, 2003 WL 21497325, at *1 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. June 20, 
2003) (”If plaintiff could recover for the emotional distress of losing her dog, such logic could be 
extended to allow recovery for emotional distress caused by the destruction of other sentimental 
items like family heirlooms, class rings or old pictures.”). In fact, a few states have created a 
“property law exception” allowing for the recovery of sentimental value for destroyed heirlooms 
and memorabilia. Goldberg, supra note 3, at 53. The theory of recovery is based on the idea that 
“unlike any other type of personal property, heirlooms and memorabilia never had a market 
value . . . and [are] kept only for sentimental reasons, and cannot be replaced with anything 
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In rebuttal, proponents of recovery argue that heirlooms and other 
forms of personal property are highly distinguishable from companion 
animals and cannot justifiably be compared because such objects are 
nonliving, cannot show love, affection, and emotion, and cannot respond to 
human stimulation.235 In 2013, the Supreme Court of Texas addressed this 
issue in Strickland v. Medlen, holding that it would neither overrule the 
state’s narrow heirloom exception nor “broaden it to pet-death cases.”236 The 
Court listed differences between heirlooms and companion animals. It 
determined that the fondness for an heirloom is “sentimental,” while the 
attachment to a companion animal is “emotional” and that the reasons behind 
the attachment to the object differ. 237  Highlighting these differences, 
proponents argue that expanding loss of companionship recovery to 
encompass companion animals will not impact the law’s view of destroyed 
heirlooms. 
Next, opponents of recovery argue that expanding loss of 
companionship damages is undesirable because it would allow for a greater 
recovery for a plaintiff whose claim involved the loss of a companion animal 
than a plaintiff whose claim involved the loss of a human relative. The 
extension of loss of companionship recovery for the loss of a child and 
parent is still fairly new and not universally recognized.238 Because many 
filial relationships are not recognized under tort law, opponents are left 
 
similar.” Id. Courts have therefore valued these items of property under the “value to the owner” 
theory. See Schwartz & Laird, supra note 17, at 242 (noting that for certain items without market 
value, such as heirlooms, a better method of valuation would be calculating the value to the 
owner). 
235 See Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1979) (“An heirloom . . . is merely an inanimate object and is not capable of returning love and 
affection. It does not respond to human stimulation; it has no brain capable of displaying 
emotion . . . But a dog—that is something else.”); see also Martin, supra note 40, at 955 (“[I]t is 
possible to meaningfully distinguish pets from other forms of personal property . . . .”). 
236 397 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2013). But see Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1076 (“Some courts 
that have valued companion animals appropriately have drawn an analogy to the common law 
regarding especially valuable personal property with no calculable market value, such as a wedding 
album or family heirloom, to hold that the intrinsic value of a companion animal to his or her 
guardian is the proper measure of damages.”). 
237  See Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 190 (“Pets afford here-and-now benefits—company, 
recreation, protection, etc.—unlike a passed-down heirloom kept around chiefly to commemorate 
past events or passed family members.”).  
238 See Agorianitis, supra note 61, at 1459-60 (“[S]ome courts have extended the concept of 
loss of companionship to include recovery based on such other relationships as parent and child.”); 
see also Waisman & Newell, supra note 179, at 50 (“Before 1977, no jurisdiction in the United States 
recognized common law loss of parental consortium as a viable claim or element of recoverable 
damages . . . . By early 1997, a total of sixteen state courts had recognized a child’s claim for loss 
of parental consortium.”). 
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uncomfortable with the idea of expanding loss of companionship to cover 
companion animals before covering these other relationships:  
[W]e do not believe it reasonable to expand tort law to allow a pet owner to 
recover emotional distress or loss of companionship damages when such 
damages cannot be recovered for . . . close human friends, siblings, and 
nonnuclear family members such as grandparents, grandchildren, nieces, 
nephews, aunts, and uncles.239  
Opponents view the bonds a person forms with a companion animal as 
inferior to those one forms with another human being. Why, then, should 
the law deem the inferior relationship more worthy of recovery?  
While opponents raise a very strong argument here, others argue that 
those who lose a companion animal grieve similarly to those who lose a 
close family member.240 The death of a companion animal is distressing to 
the point that advocates argue “most animal guardians who have bonded 
with their companion animals experience intense grief at the death of the[ir] 
companion animal[].”241 To a mourning human companion, the relationship 
with his or her beloved animal is not “inferior.” Furthermore, advocates for 
the expansion of loss of companionship recovery to human companions 
should not be perceived as opposing the idea that other human relationships 
also deserve greater respect under U.S. tort law. Proponents’ theories 
support the general idea that the law should recognize real, emotional 
connections and bonds between two living beings—animal or human. By 
bringing the mistreatment and devaluation of animal–human relationships 
under the law to the legislature’s attention, proponents may also trigger the 
legislature to rethink its view on traditional familial relationships and, for 
example, extend loss of companionship recovery to human relationships not 
already covered. 
Opponents’ next argument warns that allowing for such a recovery will 
cause a flood of claims into the court system, including fraudulent and 
frivolous claims.242 In rebuttal, proponents argue that courts can use a 
variety of measures to guarantee that claims are legitimate and that the 
recovery matches the injury. For example, courts could place a high burden 
of proof on the plaintiff to show a sufficient bond with the injured or 
 
239 Kaufman v. Langhofer, 222 P.2d 272, 279 (Ariz. 2009).  
240 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
241 Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1069 (explaining that the grieving process includes “feelings 
of denial, anger, [and] depression”). 
242 See Agorianitis, supra note 61, at 1464 (calling this the “floodgates” argument); see also 
Martin, supra note 40, at 951 (“[A] court must be cautious of inviting frivolous or fraudulent 
claims . . . .”). 
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deceased animal and the duration and depth of the relationship. 243 
Furthermore, this fear is unfounded because only a minimal number of 
plaintiffs pursue such claims to begin with.244 Creative solutions could also 
lessen any potential overburdening of the courts; claims could first filter 
through a form of alternative dispute resolution or mediation and only if 
such a process failed would parties be able to litigate a civil action.245 
Finally, opponents argue that an expansion of damages to cover the loss 
of companionship of a companion animal unfairly burdens the tortfeasor.246 
Some suggest that tortfeasors will be forced to pay “extraordinary and 
unrealistic” judgments, disproportionate to their degree of fault,247 and that 
such an outcome is “unfair.”248 Loss of companionship, like other emotional 
damages involving sentimental value, is “inherently subjective, easily 
inflatable, and potentially astronomical,” and therefore must be excluded 
from the calculation of tort damages.249 
In response, proponents argue that since tort law is guided by the 
concepts of just compensation for victims and the requirement that a 
tortfeasor should “pay for all the damages proximately caused by her 
conduct,” awards should (and will) match the egregiousness of the 
defendant’s actions and the plaintiff ’s loss suffered.250 If a defendant is 
found civilly liable for the injury to or death of a companion animal, he 
 
243 See supra subsection V.C.1 for a full discussion. 
244 See Chapman, supra note 108, at 217 (“[T]here is little evidence to support [the floodgate 
argument] because only a handful of animal owners have pursued this type of claim.”); cf. Seps, 
supra note 9, at 1367 (“[L]itigation has not spiraled out of control from the time when courts first 
began permitting awards of emotional damages for harm to humans.”).  
245 See Chapman, supra note 108, at 220, 222 (proposing a model statute requiring owners to 
assert claims first through alternative dispute resolution); see also Huss, Valuation, supra note 48, at 
549 (“Given the emotional nature of a claim[,] . . . mediation could play an essential role in 
reducing the number of claims that are litigated.”). 
246 See Chapman, supra note 108, at 215 (mentioning the opponents’ fear that “allowing non-
economic valuation of pets would overburden the tortfeasor”). 
247 See Kaufman v. Langhofer, 222 P.3d 272, 278 (Ariz. 2009) (citing other courts’ reasoning 
in refusing to award emotional damages to plaintiffs); see also Livingston, supra note 2, at 834-35 
(listing objections to expanding recovery including the “imposition of damages awards 
disproportionate to a tortfeasor’s fault”). 
248 See Chapman, supra note 108, at 203 (describing a court’s reasoning that “it would be 
unfair to place a large financial burden upon a negligent defendant”).  
249 Schwartz & Laird, supra note 17, at 242. 
250 Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1062, 1085 (“[V]aluing accident costs accurately promotes 
efficient—and lower—levels of consumption, and as a result, fewer accidents occur.”); see also 
Boxberger, supra note 13, at 142 (naming “compensation for people’s injuries” as one main 
objection of tort law). 
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must pay the damages as pronounced by the factfinder.251 Furthermore, 
many proponents of recovery agree that damages can and should be capped 
by the legislature.252 Therefore, damages for loss of companionship will 
never exceed what public policy and societal values deem acceptable.  
CONCLUSION 
Every day citizens turn to the law and the courts for redress from the 
harms they have suffered. In cases surrounding an injury to or the death of a 
companion animal, human companions look to tort law to fulfill its purpose: 
to justly compensate victims for their injuries.253 However, the system fails 
those it was created to serve. Because companion animals are classified as 
property and loss of companionship claims cover only specific human 
relationships, human companions are not able to recover the true damages 
sustained for their loss. For many, the loss of a pet is the loss of a best 
friend, a family member, and a true companion. The refusal to allow 
recovery of damages for the loss of companionship leaves plaintiffs incomplete.  
Fortunately, a minority position advocating for changes to the strict 
rules of companion animal classification and valuation and the expansion of 
loss of companionship recovery is growing in the United States. The 
changes proponents of this view advocate for are rational and in line with 
changing societal beliefs. Part IV discussed arguments reinforcing the 
minority position and Part V covered two reasonable changes to the law that 
would allow for a new classification of companion animals and a statutory 
scheme providing for loss of companionship damages to human 
companions. Only time will tell whether courts and legislatures will 
increasingly acknowledge society’s shift in the treatment of human–animal 
relationships and whether the laws classifying animals as property and those 
confining loss of companionship damages to specific human relationships 
will change. For now, those advocates supporting the minority position will 
continue to fight for proper recognition of human–animal relationships. “To 
say [a dog] is a piece of personal property and no more is a repudiation of 
our humaneness. This I cannot accept.”254 
 
251 See Chapman, supra note 108, at 203 (“To say that culpable offenders should not be liable 
for their blameworthy conduct merely because it is a large financial burden hardly seems in line 
with justice or notions of fairness.”). 
252 Id. at 215. However, many disagree as to just where noneconomic damages should be 
capped. 
253 See Squires-Lee, supra note 7, at 1062 (“Tort, at its most fundamental level, should 
compensate victims . . . .”). 
254 Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979). 
 
